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WHAT BECOMES OF NUCLEAR RISK ASSESSMENT IN LIGHT OF RADIATION
HORMESIS?
Jerry M. Cuttler  Cuttler & Associates Inc., 1781 Medallion Court, Mississauga,
ON L5J2L6, Canada
 A nuclear probabilistic risk or safety assessment (PRA or PSA) is a scientific calculation
that uses assumptions and models to determine the likelihood of plant or fuel repository
failures and the corresponding releases of radioactivity. Estimated radiation doses to the
surrounding population are linked inappropriately to risks of cancer death and congeni-
tal malformations. Even though PRAs use very pessimistic assumptions, they demonstrate
that nuclear power plants and fuel repositories are very safe compared with the health
risks of other generating options or other risks that people readily accept. Because of the
frightening negative images and the exaggerated safety and health concerns that are com-
municated, many people judge nuclear risks to be unacceptable and do not favour nuclear
plants. Large-scale tests and experience with nuclear accidents demonstrate that even
severe accidents expose the public to only low doses of radiation, and a century of
research has demonstrated that such exposures are beneficial to health. A scientific basis
for this phenomenon now exists. PRAs are valuable tools for improving plant designs, but
if nuclear power is to play a significant role in meeting future energy needs, we must com-
municate its many real benefits and dispel the negative images formed by unscientific
extrapolations of harmful effects at high doses.
I. NUCLEAR RISK ASSESSMENT
Nuclear engineers calculate the likelihood of all possible accidents at
a nuclear power plant and the resulting probability that people nearby
might be harmed by such accidents. The discipline is called probabilistic
risk or safety assessment (PRA or PSA). The best known study, completed
thirty years ago, was sponsored by the NRC and directed by N. Rasmussen
at MIT.[1] It was based on the method known as fault tree analysis.
The PRA starts with the initiating event and is followed by an “event
tree”. The first probability is the probability that event will be initiated.
Then the first branch in the event tree is examined and the probability
that each option will occur is entered. Then the next branch in each
option is examined and the probabilities that each possibility will occur
are entered, and so forth. Finally, the probabilities of the paths that lead
to the accident are summed to obtain the probability of the accident.
The NRC has set the following two safety goals in terms of the proba-
bility of a human fatality:
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• The probability that a person living near a nuclear power plant will die
soon after a nuclear accident from the radiation released in the acci-
dent must be less than 0.1% of the total probability that a person will be
killed in any accident.
• The probability of death from cancer for any member of the public fol-
lowing an accident must be less than 0.1% of the total probability that a
person will die of cancer from all causes.
Since the average probability per year that a person will die from all
accidents is about 5 × 10–4 or one chance in 2000, the first safety goal
means that the probability per year that the person living next to a
nuclear plant will die soon after a nuclear accident from the radiation
released in the accident must be 1000 times less, that is less than one
chance in two million.
The most extensive study of reactor safety ever conducted, NUREG-
1150, was completed by the NRC in 1990.[2] Five specific PWR and BWR
nuclear plants were studied. The analysis was broken down into four fun-
damental parts:
• The frequency of core damage
• Radioactive source term inside containment
• The probability of containment failure
• Calculated off-site consequences.
For one of the plants, the average probability of core damage per year
from all potential internal accident scenarios is 4 × 10–5 per year or one
chance in 25,000 per year. The range of calculated probabilities (5-95% cer-
tainty) is not greater than one chance in 8000 and not less than one chance
in 140,000 per year. Next the amount of radioactive material that can get
out of the fuel and into containment is considered, with particular focus on
iodine-131, cesium-137 and strontium-90. The next steps address the ways
that radioactivity can escape or be released from containment and the off-
site consequences, which depend on weather conditions, surrounding pop-
ulation density, the extent and timing of evacuation, and the damage to
health due to exposure to the various radionuclides that reach the people.
The final step links cancer risk to radiation exposure. It uses the linear, no-
threshold (LNT) model of radiation carcinogenesis.
The significant results of the NUREG-1150 are:
Surry (PWR) Peach Bottom (BWR) NRC Safety Goal
Average probability of an individual 2 × 10–8 5 × 10–11 5 × 10–7
early fatality per year
Average probability of an individual 2 × 10–9 4 × 10–10 2 × 10–6
latent cancer death per year
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For both the PWR and the BWR, the calculated probabilities for dam-
age to the public are far below the safety goals. These results hold for all
the reactors analyzed and for the range of probabilities calculated in addi-
tion to the average results. In addition, it was determined that the likeli-
hood per year of an accident large enough to cause at least one early fatal-
ity to the public is in the range of one in one million to one in one bil-
lion per year.
II. WHY ARE PEOPLE SO CONCERNED ABOUT NUCLEAR SAFETY?
These scientific PRA calculations show that nuclear plants are very
safe and, if the “unsolved problem” of managing used nuclear fuel (above
or below ground) is also considered,[3] nuclear power generation is much
safer than fossil-fired generation. So why are people so concerned about
the safety of nuclear power generation?
Firstly, as discussed later, the radiation protection authorities have
grossly exaggerated the hazards due to low doses of radiation, in terms of
congenital malformations and death from cancer, which are very negative
images for public perception of nuclear technology. There is no scientif-
ic evidence to support these postulated adverse health effects in nearby
populations following even worst-case accident scenarios. There is no evi-
dence of an increase in the incidence of adverse genetic effects, even
among the Japanese atom bomb survivors.[4] On the contrary, as dis-
cussed in Section V, there is recent evidence suggesting that the inci-
dence of congenital malformations after exposure to low dose rate radia-
tion is lower than the spontaneous incidence. As for cancer, the evidence
suggests that a lower incidence of cancer mortality can be expected
instead of a higher incidence. So, there is no scientific justification for the
“as low as reasonably achievable” (ALARA) requirement; the radiation
scare that has been created is not warranted.
Secondly, the probabilities for events and the associated radiation
doses, calculated in PRAs, are much greater than are really likely to occur.
Safety analysts make very conservative assumptions in creating accident
scenarios, “just to be on the safe side”. They do not take adequate credit
for the high degree of quality and safety assurance provided by the use of
nuclear standards in the design, manufacture (with nuclear-grade mate-
rials) and construction of nuclear facilities. Adequate credit is not
allowed for the high standards employed in the operation, inspection and
maintenance of nuclear facilities, which include upgrades due to feed-
back of operational experience from other facilities. Calculations of the
movement of radioactivity to nearby people are pessimistic. The analysis
methodologies employed are very conservative. Yet concerns are often
expressed about the need to “improve” nuclear safety, which have creat-
ed increased anxiety in a public that has been taught to fear any exposure
to radiation. This has been recognized. Recently, an evolution-revolution
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has begun in safety analysis technology to examine assumptions and con-
servatisms in order to model reality more accurately.[5]
Comparisons by the nuclear industry between calculated nuclear risks
and other risks that people accept will not persuade the public to accept
nuclear technologies because the industry continues to inform people
that any amount of radiation is dangerous and that the safety of nuclear
facilities has to be improved. Consequently, people make adverse judg-
ments about the acceptability of nuclear risks, which translates into con-
siderable public reluctance to accept nuclear generation.
III. WHAT ARE THE OBSERVED HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR
ACCIDENTS?
So-called “nuclear accidents” generally do not harm people, as do
automobile or airplane accidents, so better terminology is required.
Consider the consequences of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster,[6, 7, 8] which is
about the worst imaginable nuclear accident—well beyond the design
basis of modern reactor designs. Approximately 40% of the reactor core
and most of its radioactivity were released to the surroundings. The near-
by population was evacuated soon after the event. These people received
an average whole body radiation dose of 0.015 Gy (1.5 rad)(1 Gray = 1
joule/kg = 100 rad). Several thousand cases of operable thyroid cancer
(possibly naturally-occurring occult thyroid cancers) were detected in the
screening process, but no excess leukemia or other cancers were observed
during the following 14 years. These data are being reviewed continually,
and the new evidence continues to confirm these observations.
Psychological stress was the major adverse health effect due to fear of
the potential consequences that the radiation protection authorities have
been predicting. The permanent relocations have been very stressful.
Throughout the world, there was widespread fear of the radioactive con-
tamination and there were very strong social and political reactions. The
economic consequences were severe in the Ukraine and somewhat less so
in the neighbouring countries.
IV. EVOLUTION OF RADIATION PROTECTION RECOMMENDATIONS
For more than a century, beneficial health effects have been observed
following acute exposures to small doses or chronic exposures to low dose
rates of ionizing radiation.[9] Why have attitudes toward all nuclear tech-
nologies been clouded by the negative images of the risk of cancer and
congenital malfunctions for the past 50 years? Even diagnostic X-ray
exposures are resisted.
The early radiation protection recommendations were tailored to
avoid burns and late effects from acute doses of radiation. This involved
defining a safe limit for exposures (e.g., 0.2 R/d in 1934 and 0.3 R/wk in
1951). By 1955, this threshold concept was rejected by the International
What becomes of nuclear risk assessment in light of radiation hormesis?
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Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) in favour of the concept
of cancer and genetic risks, kept small compared with other hazards in
life. “Since no radiation level higher than natural background can be
regarded as absolutely ‘safe’, the problem is to choose a practical level
that, in the light of present knowledge, involves negligible risk.”[10] This
change in philosophy was brought about by new biological information—
epidemiological evidence of excess cancer malignancies among radiolo-
gists and indications of excess leukemia cases in the survivors of the atom-
ic bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki—“stochastic effects”, whose
probability of occurrence, not the severity, was assumed to be propor-
tional to the size of the dose.[10]
This is the origin of the linear, no threshold (LNT) model of radia-
tion carcinogenesis. It derives from the hypothesis that a single impact of
ionizing radiation on a cell causes an alteration, which could develop into
a mutation, which could eventually become the first cancer cell in a
tumor, which could cause death. The likelihood of this transformation,
from a normal cell to organism death, is assumed to be proportional to
dose. Following exposure to a range of high doses, statistically significant
data on the number of cancer deaths in a population (the Hiroshima-
Nagasaki survivors) in excess of the naturally-occurring (spontaneous)
number expected were fitted by a straight line. It was then extended to
zero dose through the low dose region, < 0.5 Gy, where there was no sta-
tistically significant evidence of adverse effects. 
The LNT model for an acute exposure to low LET radiation is shown
in Figure 1.[11, 12] It is still employed to calculate the excess number of can-
cer fatalities in a population following its exposure to a low dose from a
 
FIGURE 1. The linear, no threshold (LNT) dose-response model for low LET radiation-induced
cancer[11, 12]
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(human-made) source of radiation. (A risk reduction factor, in the range
from 2 to 10, may be applied to the integrated dose of a chronic exposure
at a low dose rate.) The increase in the average dose (above background)
received by this population due to the source is evaluated. This “collective
dose” is multiplied by the slope of the LNT line to predict the number of
people, in excess of the number of spontaneous cancer deaths (about a
quarter of the population), who will die from cancer. And for a person,
the incremental exposure he/she received is multiplied by this factor to
determine his/her increased risk of dying from cancer.
But why were the beneficial health effects, observed in prior years,[9]
ignored during the 1930-50s when recommendations evolved to protect
radiation workers? To understand the answer, we have to consider the
social and political environment at that time. Scientists were agonizing
over their roles in the development and actual use of A-bombs in war. The
creation of large stockpiles of more powerful nuclear weapons in several
countries raised enormous moral issues and fears about their potential
use. People realized they could not “put the genie back in the bottle”, and
many campaigned against A-bomb development, testing and production,
and for nuclear disarmament. Figure 2 is an example of the concerns that
 
FIGURE 2. Professor Linus Pauling’s telegram to President J.F. Kennedy, March 1, 1962[13]
After winning the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1953, Pauling became science’s most prominent
activist against nuclear weapons testing, a movement which led to the 1963 ban on above-ground test-
ing and Pauling’s Nobel Peace prize.
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were expressed by some scientists and others about potential, long-term
adverse health effects following exposures to very small amounts of
radioactive fallout.[13]
These concerns were based on political agendas; there was (and is)
no scientific basis for such statements. Once such concerns are created
about small amounts of radiation, it is very difficult to change attitudes
back to a scientific approach. Over the past 60 years, many research pro-
grams were carried out to study adverse biological effects, measured at
high doses and extrapolated linearly to zero dose. Observations of bene-
ficial health effects were either ignored or suppressed. The experiments
were generally not designed to observe beneficial effects.[14]
V. IS THE LNT MODEL VALID?
Intensive, wide-ranging research has been carried out on the effects
of radiation on living organisms, including humans.[15, 16, 17] Generally,
cellular stimulatory effects are observed following low doses—short-term
exposures in the range 0.01-0.50 Gy (1-50 rad)—while damaging or lethal
cellular effects are observed following high doses. This biphasic radiation
dose response is known as radiation hormesis, an adaptive response of
biological organisms to low levels of stress or damage—a modest over-
compensation to a disruption–resulting in improved fitness.[18, 19] “The
hormetic model is not an exception to the rule—it is the rule.”[20]
Recent discoveries indicate that oxidative DNA damage occurs natu-
rally to living cells at an enormous rate. Survival to old age depends on
the performance of a very capable damage-control biosystem, which pre-
vents, repairs, or removes almost all the DNA alterations.[21, 22] Figure 3
illustrates the very powerful antimutagenic performance of this biosys-
tem.[23] Those DNA alterations not eliminated by this protective system
are residual mutations, a very small fraction of which eventually develops
into cancer.
The rate of DNA mutations caused directly by background radiation
compared with the rate produced by endogenous oxygen metabolism is
extremely small. Nevertheless, radiation has a very important effect on the
damage-control biosystem. While high doses decrease biosystem activity,
causing increased cancer mortality, low doses stimulate biosystem activity
causing lower-than-normal cancer mortality. Stimulation of the immune
system increases the attack and killing of cancer cells (including metas-
tases) globally.[24] These stimulatory effects reduce or delay significantly
the incidence of cancers due to oxidative DNA damage or other causes.
The evidence of hormetic effects of radiation exposure on cancer has
lead to recent applications of whole-body, low-dose irradiation therapy
for cancer, with no symptomatic side effects.[25]
What about individuals who, because of their genetic makeup, are
radiation sensitive and cancer prone? Research has been carried out on
J. M. Cuttler
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genetically modified mice that model such people.[26] It demonstrated
that a low dose of cobalt-60 radiation affected cancer latency, reducing
the rate at which spontaneously initiated cells progressed to malignancy.
The effect of this adaptive response persisted for the lifespan of all the
animals that developed tumors.
Even chronic exposures appear to be a very effective prophylaxis
against cancer and congenital malfunctions, based on a study of about
8,000 residents who lived 9-20 years in 1700 apartments contaminated
with cobalt-60 in Taiwan.[27] They unknowingly received doses, which
averaged 0.4 Sv. 
About 186 spontaneous cancer deaths were expected in this popula-
tion, plus 56 radiation-induced deaths according to the ICRP’s LNT model.
But only five cancer deaths were observed (2.7% of the cancer mortality of
the general population). Forty-six cases of spontaneous congenital mal-
functions were expected, plus 21 radiation-induced cases according ICRP
models. Only three cases (heart disease) were observed. In 1983, the aver-
age cobalt-60 dose was about 74 mGy, and the maximum was about 910
mGy. This is well inside the range of biopositive effects for chronic radia-
tion exposure shown in Figure 4 (Figure 9.1 in Reference 16).
The conclusions regarding the health of these apartment residents,
presented by the fourteen authors of this study, are preliminary because
the age distribution of this population has not yet been determined. The
authors assumed that it is the same as that of the general Taiwan popula-
tion because these 8,000 people appear to be representative of the gen-
eral population. Another important consideration is standard of living,
because this affects diet and quality of medical care. This factor was
 
FIGURE 3. Antimutagenic DNA damage-control biosystem[23]
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reviewed, and it was determined that the residents have approximately
the same distribution of income as the general public.
The findings of this study are such a departure from those expected
by ICRP criteria that it is important that they are reviewed by other inde-
pendent organizations, and that population data not available to these
authors be provided, so that a fully qualified, epidemiologically valid
analysis can be made. Many of the confounding factors that limit other
studies used to date, such as the A-bomb survivors, the Mayak workers and
the Chernobyl evacuees, are not present in this population exposure. It
could be and should be one of the most important studies on which to
base radiation protection standards.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Instead of dwelling on hypothetical risks of cancer from extrapola-
tions, discussions about nuclear safety should point out the beneficial
health effects of low doses of radiation. Realistic, worst-case damage to a
nuclear reactor and its fuel will cause few if any deaths in the surround-
ing population.
The adverse health consequences of a nuclear accident that we
should expect are the harmful effects that an interruption in the supply
of electricity might cause and the cost to repair or replace the power
plant, which could divert precious resources away from important public
health-care programs. In general, there would be no need for long-term
mass evacuation and the associated emotional stress that would result.
Probabilistic safety assessments should only be used to identify weak-
nesses in design and operation—for corrective actions to avoid power plant
failures. PRAs should not be used to assess health risks because it is not eth-
ical to scare people with frightening myths. The health consequences of
FIGURE 4. Idealized, complete dose-response curve.[16] The ordinate indicates approximate
responses compared with the controls. The abscissa suggests mammalian whole-body exposures as
mGy/y. The numbered areas are: (1) deficient, (2) ambient, (3) hormetic, (4) optimum, (5) zero
equivalent point, and (6) harmful. 
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low doses of radiation are known to be beneficial, and this knowledge
should be shared with the public. Precautionary measures for potential
nuclear emergencies, such as mass evacuation plans and exercises, are not
warranted. They would be more appropriate for natural gas explosions and
releases of chemicals, which are much more of a safety concern.
If nuclear power is to play a significant role in meeting future energy
needs, we must communicate its many real benefits and dispel the negative
images from unscientific extrapolations of harmful effects at high dose.
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